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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a notion of structure preserving maps (i.e.
knowledge-belief morphisms) between knowledge-belief spaces. Then we
show that - under the condition that the knowledge operators of the players
in a knowledge-belief space operate just on measurable subsets of the space
- there is a unique (up to isomorphism) universal knowledge-belief space to
which every knowledge-belief space can be mapped by a unique knowledge-
belief morphism.
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1 Introduction
Type spaces in the sense of Harsanyi (1967/68) and knowledge spaces are the
most important tools to understand games of incomplete information. Player’s
uncertainty in a type space is represented by a σ-additive probability measure over
the space. In the class of type spaces there is a universal type space, in which
every state of mind of the players in each type space is represented. In other
words, a universal type space is one to which every type space can be mapped by
a structure preserving map, a so called type morphism. The existence of such a
universal type space was first proved - under some topological assumptions - by
Mertens and Zamir (1985), followed by Brandenburger and Deckel (1993), Heifetz
(1993), Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994) and Heifetz and Samet (1998b), who
proved it for more general and diverse conditions.
Knowledge spaces have been another important tool for modeling interactive
uncertainty in game theory and economics, ever since Aumann’s paper “Agreeing
to disagree” (1976). Agent’s knowledge is there modeled by ascribing to him a
partition of the space. At each element of the space (i.e. state) he knows those
events which contain the partition member that includes that state. Heifetz and
Samet (1998a) have shown that, unfortunately, unlike for Harsanyi type spaces,
there is no universal knowledge space.
What about bringing these two approaches together within one structure?
Aumann (1999b) has constructed a canonical knowledge-belief space, i.e. a
knowledge-belief space which contains all states that are can be described as max-
imal consistent sets of formulas in the language of some modal logic. However,
an appropriate definition of a structure preserving map has still to be provided
and some appropriate conditions have to be found such that there is some hope
to construct a universal knowledge-belief space under these conditions. Note that
if the knowledge operator is required to operate on every subset of the structure,
the non-existence result of Heifetz and Samet (1998a) implies that there is no
universal knowledge-belief space.
In this paper, we provide a notion of structure preserving maps (i.e. knowledge-
belief morphisms) between knowledge-belief spaces. Then we show that - under
the condition that the knowledge operators of the players in a knowledge-belief
space operate just on measurable subsets of the space - there is a unique (up to
isomorphism) universal knowledge-belief space to which every knowledge-belief
space can be mapped by a unique knowledge-belief morphism.
2 Preliminaries
Unless otherwise stated, θ denotes functions from the set of states of the world
to the set of states of nature, µ and ν denote measures, ϕ, χ, ψ expressions, and
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ω, apart form above, sets of expressions.
If not stated otherwise, we keep the following
Convention 1 If (M,Σ) is a measurable space, then ∆(M,Σ) denotes the space
of probability measures on (M,Σ). We consider this space as a measurable space
endowed with the σ-field Σ∆ generated by all the sets {µ ∈ ∆(M,Σ) | µ(E) ≥ p},
where E ∈ Σ and p ∈ [0, 1].
Remark 1 Let (M ′,Σ′) and (M,Σ) be measurable spaces and let
f :M ′ →M be measurable.
1. If µ′ is a probability measure on (M ′,Σ′), then µ′ (f−1 (·)) (that is µ′ (f−1 (E)) ,
for E ∈ Σ) is a probability measure on (M,Σ).
2. If ∆f : ∆(M
′,Σ′) → ∆(M,Σ) is defined by ∆f (µ′) := µ′ (f−1 (·)) , for
µ′ ∈ ∆(M ′,Σ′), then ∆f is measurable, since we have ∆f (µ′) (E) ≥ p iff
µ′ (f−1 (E)) ≥ p, for E ∈ Σ.
For the rest of this section, we fix a nonempty set of players I, a nonempty
set of states of nature S, and, unless otherwise stated, a σ-field ΣS on S, such
that for all s, s′ ∈ S with s 6= s′ there is a E ∈ ΣS such that s ∈ E and s′ /∈ E.
We define now knowledge-belief spaces, i.e. the objects which we will study
in the rest of this paper.
Definition 1 Let (M,Σ) be a measurable space.
A function K : Σ→ Σ is called a knowledge operator iff it satisfies the following
properties:
1. K (E) ⊆ E,
2. E ⊆ F implies K (E) ⊆ K (F ) ,
3. ¬K (E) ⊆ K (¬K (E)) ,
4. ∩n∈NK (En) ⊆ K (∩n∈NEn) .
Remark 2 Let K be a knowledge operator on the measurable space (M,Σ) .
Then we have
K (E) ⊆ K (K (E)) , for all E ∈ Σ.
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Proof See Aumann 99a, p. 270.
Definition 2 A knowledge-belief space on S for player set I is a 5-tuple
M :=
〈
M,Σ, (Ki)i∈I , (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
,
where
• M is a nonempty set,
• Σ is a σ-field on M ,
• Ki is a knowledge operator on (M,Σ), for i ∈ I,
• for i ∈ I : Ti is a Σ − Σ∆-measurable function form M to ∆ (M,Σ) , the
space of probability measures on (M,Σ) ,
• for m ∈M and E ∈ Σ : m ∈ Ki (E) implies Ti (m) (E) = 1,
• for m ∈M and E ∈ Σ : [Ti (m)] ⊆ E implies m ∈ Ki (E) , where [Ti (m)] :=
{m′ ∈M | Ti (m′) = Ti (m)} ,
• θ is a Σ-ΣS-measurable function from M to S.
We define now the beliefs preserving maps between knowledge-belief spaces.
Definition 3 LetM ′ =
〈
M ′,Σ′, (K ′i)i∈I , (T
′
i )i∈I , θ
′〉 andM = 〈M,Σ, (Ki)i∈I , (Ti)i∈I , θ〉
be knowledge-belief spaces on S for player set I.
A function f : M ′ → M is a knowledge-belief morphism if it satisfies the
following conditions:
1. f is Σ′ − Σ-measurable,
2. for all m′ ∈M ′ :
θ′ (m′) = θ (f (m′)) ,
3. for all E ∈ Σ, and i ∈ I :
K ′i
(
f−1 (E)
)
= f−1 (Ki (E)) ,
4. for all m′ ∈M ′, E ∈ Σ, and i ∈ I :
Ti (f (m
′)) (E) = T ′i (m
′)
(
f−1 (E)
)
.
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Definition 4 A knowledge-belief morphism is a knowledge-belief isomorphism,
if it is one-to-one, onto, and the inverse function is also a knowledge-belief mor-
phism.
It is easy to see that a function f : M ′ → M is a knowledge-belief isomorphism
iff it is a knowledge-belief morphism and isomorphism of the measurable spaces
(M ′,Σ′) and (M,Σ) .
An easy check shows:
Remark 3 knowledge-belief spaces on S for player set I, as objects, and knowledge-
belief morphisms, as morphisms, form a category.
Definition 5 A knowledge-belief space Ω on S for player set I is universal1
if for every knowledge-belief space M on S for player set I there is a unique
knowledge-belief morphism from M to Ω.
Remark 4 Universal knowledge-belief spaces on S for player set I are unique up
to knowledge-belief isomorphism.
Proof If Ω and U are universal knowledge-belief spaces (on the same space of
states of nature and for the same player set, of course), then there are knowledge-
belief morphisms f : U → Ω and g : Ω→ U. It is easy to check, that the composite
of two knowledge-belief morphisms is also a knowledge-belief morphism and that
the identity is always a knowledge-belief morphism form a knowledge-belief space
Ω to itself. By the uniqueness , it follows that g ◦ f = idU and therefore f is
one-to-one and g is onto, and f ◦ g = idΩ and therefore g is one-to-one and f is
onto. f and g are knowledge-belief morphisms and f = g−1 and g = f−1.
1We use here the term “universal knowledge-belief space” although, in terms of category
theory the term “terminal knowledge-belief space” would be the adequate one, since the uni-
versal knowledge-belief space is a terminal object in the category of knowledge-belief spaces.
However, we take the former notion to keep the terms of the already existing literature.
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3 The Universal knowledge-belief space in Terms
of Expressions
Again, for this section, unless otherwise stated, we fix a nonempty player set I,
and a measurable space of states of nature (S,ΣS) such that for all s, s
′ ∈ S with
s 6= s′ there is a E ∈ ΣS such that s ∈ E and s′ /∈ E.
Given these data, we define kb-expressions (allowing also for infinite conjunc-
tions) which are natural generalizations of the expressions defined by Heifetz and
Samet (1998b). Expressions are defined in a similar fashion as, for example,
the formulas of the probability logic of Heifetz and Mongin (2001). Analogous
to Heifetz and Samet (1998b), given a knowledge-belief space on S for player
set I and a state of the world in this knowledge-belief space, we define the kb-
description of this state as the set of those kb-expressions that are true in this
state of the world. Then, we show that the set of all kb-descriptions constitutes
a knowledge-belief space (Proposition 4) and that this knowledge-belief space is
the universal knowledge-belief space (Theorem 1).
Definition 6 For a knowledge-belief space
〈
M,Σ, (Ki)i∈I (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
on S for
player set I, i ∈ I, E ∈ Σ, and p ∈ [0, 1] define
Bpi (E) := {m ∈M | Ti (m) (E) ≥ p} .
Note that Bpi (E) = T
−1
i ({µ ∈ ∆(M,Σ) | µ (E) ≥ p}) and that Bpi (E) ∈ Σ,
if E ∈ Σ.
Definition 7 Given a measurable space of states of nature (S,ΣS) and a nonempty
player set I, the set Φ of kb-expressions is the least set such that:
1. every E ∈ ΣS is an expression,
2. if ϕ is an expression, then ¬ϕ is an expression,
3. if ϕ is an expression, then ki (ϕ) is an expression, for i ∈ I,
4. if ϕ is an expression, then bpi (ϕ) is an expression, for i ∈ I and p ∈ [0, 1] ,
5. if Ψ is a nonempty set of expressions with |Ψ| ≤ ℵ0, then
∧
ϕ∈Ψ ϕ is an
expression.
If Ψ is a nonempty set of expressions with |Ψ| ≤ ℵ0, then we set
∨
ϕ∈Ψ ϕ :=
¬∧ϕ∈Ψ ¬ϕ.
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Definition 8 Let M :=
〈
M,Σ, (Ki)i∈I , (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
be a knowledge-belief space
on S for player set I. Define
1. EM := θ−1 (E) , for E ∈ ΣS,
2. (¬ϕ)M :=M \ ϕM , for ϕ ∈ Φ,
3. (ki (ϕ))
M := Ki
(
ϕM
)
, for ϕ ∈ Φ and i ∈ I,
4. (bpi (ϕ))
M := Bpi
(
ϕM
)
, for ϕ ∈ Φ, i ∈ I and p ∈ [0, 1] ,
5.
(∧
ϕ∈Ψ ϕ
)M
:=
⋂
ϕ∈Ψ ϕ
M , for at most countable Ψ such that ∅ 6= Ψ ⊆ Φ.
So, defined as above, kb-expressions define measurable subsets ofM. It is easy to
check that
(∨
ϕ∈Ψ ϕ
)M
:=
⋃
ϕ∈Ψ ϕ
M , for Ψ such that ∅ 6= Ψ ⊆ Φ and |Ψ| ≤ ℵ0.
If no confusion may arise, we sometimes omit - with some abuse of notation
- the superscript M.
Definition 9 For a knowledge-belief space M :=
〈
M,Σ, (Ki)i∈I , (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
on
S for player set I and m ∈M define D (m) , the kb-description of m, as
D (m) :=
{
ϕ ∈ Φ | m ∈ ϕM} .
Proposition 1 Let
〈
M,Σ, (Ki)i∈I , (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
and 〈N,ΣN , (KNi )i∈I , (TNi )i∈I , θN〉
be knowledge-belief spaces on S for player set I and let f : M → N be a kb-
morphism.
Then, for all m ∈M :
D (f (m)) = D (m) .
Proof We show by induction on the formation of the expressions that m ∈ ϕM
iff f (m) ∈ ϕN :
• Let E ∈ ΣS. We have θN (f (m)) = θ (m) , so f (m) ∈ EN iff m ∈ EM .
• We have
f (m) ∈ (¬ϕ)N iff f (m) /∈ ϕN iff m /∈ ϕM iff m ∈ (¬ϕ)M .
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• Let Ψ be a nonempty set of expressions with |Ψ| ≤ ℵ0. Then:
f (m) ∈ (
∧
ϕ∈Ψ
ϕ)N iff for all ϕ ∈ Ψ : f (m) ∈ ϕN ,
which is by induction hypothesis the case iff for all ϕ ∈ Ψ : m ∈ ϕM , which
is the case iff m ∈ (∧ϕ∈Ψ ϕ)M .
• We have
f (m) ∈ (ki (ϕ))N iff f (m) ∈ KNi
(
ϕN
)
iff m ∈ f−1 (KNi (ϕN)) iff m ∈ Ki (f−1 (ϕN)) .
By the induction hypothesis, we have f−1
(
ϕN
)
= ϕM . Hence it follows that
f (m) ∈ (ki (ϕ))N iff m ∈ (ki (ϕ))M .
• We have
f (m) ∈ (bpi (ϕ))N iff TNi (f (m))
(
ϕN
) ≥ p iff Ti (m) (f−1 (ϕN)) ≥ p.
By the induction hypothesis: f−1
(
ϕN
)
= ϕM . Hence Ti (m)
(
f−1
(
ϕN
))
=
Ti (m)
(
ϕM
)
. We have Ti (m)
(
ϕM
) ≥ p iff m ∈ (bpi (ϕ))M . It follows that
f (m) ∈ (bpi (ϕ))N iff m ∈ (bpi (ϕ))M .
Definition 10 Define Ω to be the set of all kb-descriptions of states of the world
in knowledge-belief spaces on S for player set I. For ϕ ∈ Φ define
[ϕ] := {ω ∈ Ω | ϕ ∈ ω} .
Obviously, we have Ω \ [ϕ] = [¬ϕ] and ⋂ψ∈Ψ [ψ] = [∧ψ∈Ψ ψ] , where ϕ is an
kb-expression and Ψ is a nonempty set of kb-expressions with |Ψ| ≤ ℵ0. It follows
that:
Remark 5 The set
ΣΩ := {[ϕ] | ϕ ∈ Φ}
is a σ-field on Ω.
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Lemma 1 For every knowledge-belief space M on S for player set I and for
every ϕ ∈ Φ, the kb-description map D :M → Ω satisfies
D−1 ([ϕ]) = ϕM .
Proof Clear by the definition of [ϕ].
Note that Lemma 1 implies that D is measurable.
Definition 11 For ϕ ∈ Φ define:
K∗i ([ϕ]) := [ki (ϕ)] .
Proposition 2 For every knowledge-belief spaceM :=
〈
M,Σ, (Ki)i∈I , (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
on S for player set I, for every ϕ ∈ Φ and every i ∈ I, the kb-description map
D :M → Ω satisfies
Ki
(
D−1 ([ϕ])
)
= D−1 (K∗i ([ϕ])) .
Proof By Lemma 1 we have
Ki
(
D−1 ([ϕ])
)
= Ki
(
ϕM
)
= (ki (ϕ))
M = D−1 ([ki (ϕ)]) = D−1 (K∗i ([ϕ])) .
Proposition 3 For every i ∈ I there exists a function
T ∗i : Ω→ ∆(Ω,ΣΩ)
such that for every knowledge-belief space M on S for player set I with kb-
description map D and every m ∈M :
T ∗i (D (m)) = Ti (m) ◦D−1.
Proof For ω ∈ Ω chose a knowledge-belief space M on S for player set I and
m ∈M such that D (m) = ω. For [ϕ] ∈ ΣΩ define
T ∗i (ω) ([ϕ]) := Ti (m) ◦D−1 ([ϕ]) .
We have
Ti (m) ◦D−1 ([ϕ]) = Ti (m)
(
ϕM
)
= sup {p | bpi (ϕ) ∈ D (m)} ,
so T ∗i (ω) ([ϕ]) depends just on D (m) and is well-defined. By Remark 1, we have
Ti (m) ◦D−1 ∈ ∆(Ω,ΣΩ) .
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Lemma 2 There is a measurable function θ∗ : Ω → S such that for every
knowledge-belief space M on S for player set I and every m ∈M :
θ∗ (D (m)) = θ (m) .
Proof Let
d0 (m) :=
{
E ∈ ΣS | m ∈ θ−1 (E)
}
.
Obviously, d0 (m) = D (m) ∩ ΣS. By the properties of (S,ΣS) , we have for all
s ∈ S : {s} = ⋂s∈E∈ΣS E. It follows for every knowledge-belief space M ′ on S for
player set I and m′ ∈M ′ that
θ (m′) = s iff d0 (m′) = {E | s ∈ E} .
For ω ∈ Ω chose a knowledge-belief space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M,
such that D (m) = ω. Define now θ∗ (ω) := θ (m) . Since θ (m) just depends on
D (m) , θ∗ (ω) is well-defined.
It remains to show that θ∗ is measurable: Let E ∈ ΣS. We have
θ∗ (D (m)) ∈ E iff m ∈ θ−1 (E) iff E ∈ D (m) iff D (m) ∈ [E] .
It follows that θ∗−1 (E) = [E] .
Lemma 3 K∗i is a knowledge operator on (Ω,ΣΩ) , for every i ∈ I.
Proof Let (χn)n∈N , ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ and M be a knowledge-belief space and m ∈M.
1. Let D (m) ∈ K∗i ([ϕ]) . Then, we have m ∈ Ki
(
ϕM
)
and therefore m ∈ ϕM .
It follows that D (m) ∈ [ϕ] .
2. Let [ϕ] ⊆ [ψ] andD (m) ∈ K∗i ([ϕ]) .We have ϕM = D−1 ([ϕ]) ⊆ D−1 ([ψ]) =
ψM and m ∈ Ki
(
ϕM
)
. It follows that m ∈ Ki
(
ψM
)
and therefore D (m) ∈
K∗i ([ψ]) .
3. Let D (m) ∈ ΩK∗i ([ϕ]) . We have m ∈ MKi
(
ϕM
)
and therefore m ∈
Ki
(
MKi
(
ϕM
))
. By the definitions, we have D (m) ∈ [ki (¬ki (ϕ))] . It
follows that D (m) ∈ K∗i (ΩK∗i ([ϕ])) .
4. LetD (m) ∈ ∩n∈NK∗i ([χn]) . It follows thatm ∈ ∩n∈NKi
(
χMn
)
and therefore
m ∈ Ki
(∩n∈NχMn ) . By the definitions, we have D (m) ∈ [ki (∧n∈N χn)] . It
follows that K∗i (∩n∈N [χn]) .
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Proposition 4 〈
Ω,ΣΩ, (K
∗
i )i∈I , (T
∗
i )i∈I , θ
∗〉
is a knowledge-belief space on S for player set I.
Proof It remains to show:
1. Ω is nonempty.
2. For every i ∈ I : T ∗i is measurable as a function from Ω to ∆ (Ω,ΣΩ) .
3. For every i ∈ I, ω ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ Φ : ω ∈ K∗i ([ϕ]) implies T ∗i (ω) ([ϕ]) = 1.
4. For every i ∈ I, ω ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ Φ :
{ω′ ∈ Ω | T ∗i (ω′) = T ∗i (ω)} ⊆ [ϕ] ,
implies ω ∈ K∗i ([ϕ]) .
To:
1. Let M := {m} and chose s ∈ S. Set Σ := Pow (M) , Ti (m) := δm, for i ∈ I,
and θ (m) := s. Then 〈
M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ
〉
is a knowledge-belief space on S for player set I.
2. Since inverse images commute with unions, intersections and complements,
it is enough to show that T ∗−1i (b
p (E)) ∈ ΣΩ, for
{µ ∈ ∆(Ω,ΣΩ) | µ (E) ≥ p} ,
where E ∈ ΣΩ and p ∈ [0, 1] . We have
T ∗−1i ({µ ∈ ∆(Ω,ΣΩ) | µ (E) ≥ p}) = {ω ∈ Ω | T ∗i (ω) (E) ≥ p} .
Since E ∈ ΣΩ, there is a -expression ϕ such that E = [ϕ] . Note that if
p ∈ [0, 1] and p = sup {q | bqi (ϕ) ∈ ω} , then bpi (ϕ) ∈ ω. This implies that
ω ∈ T ∗−1i ({µ ∈ ∆(Ω,ΣΩ) | µ (E) ≥ p}) iff bpi (ϕ) ∈ ω.
It follows that T ∗−1i ({µ ∈ ∆(Ω,ΣΩ) | µ (E) ≥ p}) = [bpi (ϕ)] .
3. Chose a knowledge-belief space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M such
that D (m) = ω. Since ω ∈ K∗i ([ϕ]) , we have by Proposition 2 and Lemma
1 m ∈ Ki
(
ϕM
)
and therefore 1 = Ti (m)
(
ϕM
)
= Ti (m) (D
−1 ([ϕ])) =
T ∗i (D (m)) ([ϕ]) .
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4. Let ϕ be a -expression and
{ω′ ∈ Ω | T ∗i (ω′) = T ∗i (ω)} ⊆ [ϕ] .
Chose a knowledge-belief space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M such
that D (m) = ω. Let m′ ∈ M. If T ∗i (D (m′)) 6= T ∗i (D (m)) , then there is a
kb-expression ψ such that Ti (m
′)
(
ψM
) 6= Ti (m) (ψM) . It follows that
D ({m′ ∈M | Ti (m′) = Ti (m)}) ⊆ {ω′ ∈ Ω | T ∗i (ω′) = T ∗i (ω)} ,
which implies
{m′ ∈M | Ti (m′) = Ti (m)} ⊆ D−1 ([ϕ]) = ϕM .
So we have
m ∈ Ki
(
ϕM
)
= (ki (ϕ))
M .
And hence, ω ∈ [ki (ϕ)] = K∗i ([ϕ]) .
Lemma 4 The kb-description map
D : Ω→ Ω
is the identity.
Proof For ω ∈ Ω, we have
ω = {ϕ ∈ Φ | ω ∈ [ϕ]} .
We have to show that for every kb-expression ϕ and every ω ∈ Ω : ω ∈ ϕΩ iff
ω ∈ [ϕ] . We know this already if ϕ = E, where E ∈ ΣS. It is obvious that
Ω \ [ϕ] = [¬ϕ] , and that if Ψ is a nonempty set of kb-expressions of cardinality
≤ ℵ0, then ⋂
ϕ∈Ψ
[ϕ] =
[∧
ϕ∈Ψ
ϕ
]
.
By the definition, we haveK∗i ([ϕ]) = [ki (ϕ)] . So it remains to show that [ϕ] = ϕ
Ω
implies [bpi (ϕ)] = B
p
i ([ϕ]) . For ω ∈ Ω, chose a knowledge-belief space M on S
for player set I and m ∈M such that D (m) = ω. We have
D (m) ∈ [bpi (ϕ)] iff bpi (ϕ) ∈ D (m) iff Ti (m)
(
ϕM
) ≥ p.
But we have
T ∗i (ω) ([ϕ]) = Ti (m) ◦D−1 ([ϕ]) = Ti (m)
(
ϕM
)
.
This implies that [bpi (ϕ)] = B
p
i ([ϕ]) .
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Theorem 1 The space 〈
Ω,ΣΩ, (T
∗
i )i∈I , θ
∗〉
is a universal knowledge-belief space on S for player set I.
Proof According to Lemma 1, for every knowledge-belief space M on S for
player set I, the kb-description map D :M → Ω is measurable, and according to
Proposition 3 and Lemma 2, D is a type morphism. It remains to show that it is
the unique knowledge-belief morphism fromM to Ω. But this clear by Proposition
1 and Lemma 4.
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